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PUBLISH AND PERISH: CONGRESS'S
EFFORT TO SNIP SNEPP
(BEFORE AND AFSA)
Michael J. Glennon*
Over three million present and former federal employees, of the
Executive as well as the Congress, are parties to so-called "pre-publi-
cation review agreements,"' which require that they submit any writ-
ings on topics related to their employment for Executive review prior
to publication. In Section 630 of the Omnibus Continuing Resolution
for Fiscal Year 1988,2 Congress attempted to restrict the use of funds
to implement or enforce certain of those agreements. On May 27,
1988, however, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, in American Foreign Service Association v. Garfinkel
("AFSA "),3 struck that section down, on the theory that the statute
trenched upon the President's general foreign affairs powers under the
Constitution. The plaintiffs have appealed the ruling directly to the
United States Supreme Court, and the Court has noted probable
jurisdiction.4
The May 27 decision of the District Court was not simply without
precedent; the decision was an ill-considered and radical exercise of
judicial activism.
The AFSA decision was ill-considered in that it is inconsistent with
the court's own later, more considered, reasoning. On May 27, 1988,
the court struck down Section 630 of the Continuing Resolution as an
unconstitutional intrusion by the Congress upon the power of the Ex-
ecutive to conduct the nation's foreign affairs.5 Yet in its July 29, 1988
memorandum opinion in a companion case,6 the court held that cer-
© 1989 Princeton University Press.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. Portions of this article
are excerpted from the author's forthcoming book, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY, to be pub-
lished by the Princeton University Press. Reproduced with permission of the publisher.
1. General Accounting Office Testimony, HEARING ON CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION'S SECRECY PLEDGES BEFORE SUBCOMM. ON LEGISLATION & NATIONAL SECURITY OF
HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 3-4 (Aug. 10, 1988).
2. Pub.L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-432 (1987).
3. 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988), prob. juri& noted, 109 S.Ct. 302 (1988)..
4. 109 S. Ct. 302 (October 31, 1988).
5. 688 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1988).
6. National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1196 (1988).
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tain of those same agreements proscribed by Section 630 - those us-
ing the term "classifiable" - are constitutionally unenforceable. 7
How could First Amendment interests that were accorded no weight
on May 27 outweigh all other constitutional interests on July 29? Can
Congress not constitutionally deny funds for the enforcement of agree-
ments that are constitutionally unenforceable? If this subject matter is
within the exclusive constitutional prerogative of the President, how is
it that a federal district court judge in the July 29 opinion can substi-
tute his judgment for that of the President by precluding the use of
agreements that the President deems appropriate? One would have
supposed that the deference traditionally accorded an act of Congress
- long regarded as presumptively constitutional - would have coun-
seled the need for more judicious and deliberate consideration of this
delicate issue.
The decision is radical in that it disregards fundamental and time-
honored doctrines of Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is the only
decision in American case law in which a court has invalidated an act
of Congress on the basis of a general presidential foreign affairs power.
Moreover, it is the only case in which a court has invalidated an exer-
cise of Congress's power of the purse as an unconstitutional encroach-
ment on executive power.
The AFSA case raises key constitutional issues going deep to the
heart of the conduct of foreign affairs. The court resolves those issues
in a manner that endangers the most established of the "checks and
balances" of our system of government, the power of the purse. Un-
derlying the court's opinion is a policy choice that discards altogether
interests in freedom of expression.
I. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
Although it has often been asserted that the President is possessed
of plenary foreign affairs powers - powers that do not admit of the
possibility of congressional limitation - the truth is that no court has
ever so held. Until AFSA, every time the courts have reached the mer-
its in a foreign affairs dispute pitting Congress against the Executive,
Congress has won. The seminal precedent, overlooked completely by
the AFSA court, is Little v. Barreme,8 decided in 1804 by Chief Justice
John Marshall and joined by a unanimous United States Supreme
Court.9
7. 695 F. Supp. at 1202-05.
8. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
9. Id. at 179.
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The events leading up to Little occurred during the administration
of President John Adams, when the United States was engaged in an
undeclared naval war with France.' 0 Although the war was not for-
mally declared, Congress did prohibit American vessels from sailing to
French ports." The Navy seized a vessel sailing from a French port.
Captain Little captured this ship, the Flying Fish, and sought to have
her condemned.' 2 The case turned on whether the Danish owners of
the Flying Fish should be awarded damages for the injuries they
suffered. I3
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment awarding
damages to the owners.' 4 The ship captain's act contravened the will
of Congress. "[T]he legislature seems to have prescribed that the man-
ner in which this law shall be carried into execution," Marshall wrote,
"was to exclude a seizure of any vessel not bound to a French port."' 5
Under the law enacted by Congress, therefore, Captain Little "would
not have been authorized to detain" The Flying Fish. 16 "[T]he instruc-
tions [from the Secretary of the Navy]," Marshall concludes, "cannot
change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which, without
those instructions, would have been a plain trespass."'?
During the Korean War, Marshall's analysis again became timely
in another case also completely overlooked by the district court in
AFSA. In 1952, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer' 8 - the
famed Steel Seizure Case - presented the Supreme Court with a stark
choice. A nation-wide strike had broken out in the steel industry. Ac-
cording to the Youngstown court:
The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons
and other war materials led the President to believe that the proposed
work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defense and
that governmental seizure of the steel mills was necessary in order to
assure the continued availability of steel. 19
10. Id. at 173, 177. See H. BLUMENTHAL, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES: THEIR DIP-
LOMATIC RELATIONSHIP 1789-1914, 13-17 (1970); D. MCKAY, THE UNITED STATES AND
FRANCE, 81-83 (1951).
11. Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 2, § 1, 3 Stat. 613 (1799) (expired 1800).
12. Id. at 176. Little had some reason to suspect the Flying Fish's true nationality: "[D]uring
the chase by the American frigates, the [Flying Fish's] master threw overboard the log-book, and
certain other papers." Id. at 173 (emphasis in original).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 179.
15. Id. at 177-78 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 178.
17. Id. at 179.
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19. Id. at 583.
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President Truman consequently issued an executive order directing
the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the mills and
keep them running, arguing that the President had "inherent power"
to do so. The companies objected, complaining in court that the
seizure was not authorized by the Constitution or by any statute.
Congress had not statutorily authorized the seizure, either before
or after it occurred. Congress had enacted three statutes providing for
governmental seizure of the mills in certain specifically prescribed situ-
ations, but the Administration never claimed that any of those condi-
tions had existed prior to its action. More important, Congress had in
fact considered, and rejected, authorization for exactly the sort of
seizure Truman actually ordered.
Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Presi-
dent, Justice Black wrote, had engaged in law-making, a task assigned
by the Constitution to Congress.20 The seizure was therefore unlaw-
ful, since the "President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."'21 Yet
Youngstown is remembered mostly for the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Robert Jackson. In reasoning strikingly reminiscent of Marshall's
in Little, Jackson wrote that "[p]residential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those
of Congress."'22 He continued:
We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical
situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his
powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this fac-
tor of relativity.
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied au-
thorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.
In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it
may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the
Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure exe-
cuted by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be sup-
ported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily
upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
20. Id. at 587-89.
21. Id. at 585.
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may some-
times, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain
exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Con-
gress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once
so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what
is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
23
The opinion is thus notable for its unwillingness to decide the case
by reference to "inherent" presidential power, and in the weight it ac-
cords Congressional will. It remained for a former Jackson clerk, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, to give Jackson's opinion the force of law. The
Supreme Court formally adopted this mode of analysis in Dames &
Moore v. Regan,24 in which Justice Rehnquist applied Jackson's ap-
proach to uphold President Carter's Iranian hostage settlement agree-
ment as having been authorized by Congress. 25 In so doing,
Rehnquist wrote that Jackson's opinion "brings together as much
combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area."
26
Rehnquist then quoted from Jackson a passage that the AFSA court
might profitably have pondered: "[t]he example of such unlimited ex-
ecutive power that must have most impressed the forefathers was the
prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its evils in
the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were
creating their new Executive in his image."
27
23. Id. at 635-38.
24. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
25. Id. at 688.
26. Id. at 661.
27. Id. at 662. Compare Alexander Hamilton, no admirer of legislatures:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which
would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind as
those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world to the sole disposal of ... a
President of the United States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 505-06 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
An important recent reaffirmation of this approach is found in Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct.
2047 (1988), discussed further below. Despite the protestations of the two dissenters, the Court
- speaking again through Chief Justice Rehnquist - grounded on congressional will rather
than constitutional principle its conclusion that a former CIA employee was not precluded from
seeking judicial review of the decision by which he was dismissed. Justice Scalia, dissenting,
worried that the majority's opinion
will have ramifications far beyond creation of the world's only secret intelligence agency
that must litigate the dismissal of its agents. If constitutional claims can be raised in this
Winter 1989]
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This, then, is the mode of analysis pursued by the United States
Supreme Court in assessing the reach of presidential foreign affairs
power. Jackson's point bears repeating: "Presidential powers are not
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction
with those of Congress;"' 28 and further, "[w]hen the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,
his power is at its lowest ebb .... 29
Section 630 of the 1988 Continuing Resolution placed presidential
use of specified pre-publication review agreements in this third cate-
gory of Justice Jackson's analysis, where- his power to use those agree-
ments is at its lowest ebb. Any other case used for precedential
purposes must therefore fall within this third category. Cases dealing
with presidential acts that fall within Justice Jackson's first or second
categories - where Congress has approved, and where Congress is
silent - are not on point. The four cases relied upon by the district
court in AFSA are, for this reason, altogether irrelevant to the consti-
tutionality of Section 630.
The first case, Department of the Navy v. Eagan,30 raised the issue
whether the statutory structure permitted administrative review of the
merits of a security-clearance denial underlying an employee's re-
moval. The "statute's 'express language' along with 'the structure of
the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the na-
ture of the administrative action involved' " all militated against such
review. 31 Congress thus agreed, rather than disagreed, with the Exec-
utive's position. Indeed, in an important passage unnoted by the
AFSA court, the Supreme Court in this case pointed out that deference
to the Executive in military and national security affairs is only appro-
priate "unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise." 32 In Sec-
tion 630, Congress specifically provided otherwise.
The second case is represented by part of the concurring opinion of
Justice Potter Stewart in The Pentagon Papers Case.33 Unfortunately,
the AFSA court neglected to include the most pertinent portion of Jus-
tice Stewart's opinion - his observation that, in that case, the Court
was "asked neither to construe specific regulations nor to apply spe-
highly sensitive context, it is hard to imagine where they cannot. The assumption that there
are any executive decisions that cannot be hauled into the courts may no longer be valid.
Id. at 2063.
28. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 635-38.
30. 108 S.Ct. 818 (1988).
31. Id. at 825, quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984).
32. Id. at 825.
33. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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cific laws."' 34 In other words, the controversy fell within Jackson's
second category - the "zone of twilight." The case, unlike AFSA,
presented no disagreement between Congress and the Executive (the
AFSA court also neglects to note one other minor aspect of The Penta-
gon Papers Case: the Executive lost).
The third case, United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph
Co. 35 , seems to be cited by the AFSA district court as authority that
the role of Congress in this realm is limited to the protection of its own
access to classified information, rather than the "intrusion upon the
President's oversight of national security information .... ",36 In fact,
the case said nothing of the sort. While it did present "nerve-center
constitutional questions, ' 37 the court expressly declined to resolve
those issues,38 urging the parties to pursue an out-of-court settlement.
No statute was struck down; no executive act flouting the will of Con-
gress was upheld.
The fourth case is the old war-horse, United States v. Curtiss-
Wright. 39 Those words - Curtiss- Wright - often are ritualistically
incanted in executive efforts aimed at exorcising the demons of legisla-
tive limitation.40 But the holding of Curtiss- Wright hardly lends itself
to such labors, for the circumstances in which the case arose - the
facts to which a holding is perforce confined - constituted anything
but a legislative-executive confrontation. The posture of Congress in
that case, unlike AFSA, was support for the President, not opposition.
34. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J. concurring).
35. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
36. 688 F. Supp. at 685.
37. 551 F.2d at 394.' These issues related to the petition of the Justice Department to enjoin a
telephone company from complying with a congressional subpoena issued in the course of an
investigation into warrantless "national security" wiretaps.
38. Id. at 393.
39. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
40. For example, see the remarks of Lt. Col. Oliver North during the Iran-Contra hearings in
1987:
MR. NORTH. [I]n the 1930s in the U.S. vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation ... the
Supreme Court again held that it was within the purview of the President of the United
States to conduct secret activities and to conduct secret negotiations to further the foreign
policy goals of the United States.
MR. MITCHELL. If I may just say, Colonel, the Curtiss-Wright case said no such
thing. It involved public matters that were the subject of a law and a prosecution....
I just think the record should reflect that Curtiss-Wright was on a completely different
factual situation and there is no such statement in the Curtiss-Wright case.
MR. SULLIVAN. I disagree with you. I think it is a little unfair ... to have a debate
with Colonel North. ...
Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions With Iran, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (part II) 38 (1987)(Testimony of
Oliver North).
Michigan Journal of International Law
The case falls in Jackson's first category, not his third. 4'
The AFSA court thus relies upon precedential props that collapse
under examination., No case that the court cites supports the notion
that the President can use appropriated funds to enforce pre-publica-
tion review agreements when Congress has expressly denied funds for
that purpose. In an effort to shore up its shaky conclusion, the AFSA
court thus turns to a student law review note for the proposition that
"[n]ever has the President's authority in this area been dependent
upon express legislative authorization. '42 Unfortunately, the note ob-
serves on the very page cited by the court that "authority for the prac-
tice is said to be implicit in a number of statutes. ' 43 To the extent that
such authority is conferred statutorily, of course, it can be limited or
repealed statutorily. The court elsewhere seems not to have appreci-
ated the note's full import. The court, for example, cites the note as
authority for the proposition that Presidents "have been protecting na-
tional security information since World War I." Yet woven through-
out the note's discussion are repeated references to relevant
authorizing legislation, and the note nowhere suggests that Congress
would lack power to prohibit the use of funds to limit the means by
which national security information is protected." Indeed, at no point
in the note does any reference appear to pre-publication review agree-
ments, for the apparent reason that, whatever Presidents may have
been doing "since World War I," none before Ronald Reagan widely
and routinely employed such agreements.
II. THE POWER OF THE PURSE
Section 630 represents a classic, textbook exercise of Congress's
power of the purse: it prohibits the expenditure of certain appropri-
ated funds for a specified purpose.
The text of the Constitution prohibits statutorily unauthorized ex-
penditures by the President. Article I, section 9, clause 7 confers on
Congress exclusive power of the purse. It provides that "no money
shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations
41. Little v. Barreme, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, and United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright are examined in greater depth in Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs
Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5 (1988).
42. The piece cited is Developments in the Law - The National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1972).
43. Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
44. The court apparently accepts without criticism the Administration's argument "that
Congress (can] be excluded from restricting the means by which the Executive protects national
security." It is difficult to take seriously the suggestion that any means elected by the Executive
to protect the national security is constitutionally permissible and immune from congressional
restriction as well as judicial review - yet that clearly seems to be the implication of the court.
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made by law." The only textual prohibitions against the use of the
appropriations power to curtail the activities of another branch are the
requirements that the Justices of the Supreme Court and the President
receive a compensation that may not be diminished. 45 Had the Fram-
ers intended further limitations on the appropriations power they
seemingly would have included them. Indeed, in the case of "national
security" matters they placed even greater checks in the hands of Con-
gress. In addition to the power to appropriate funds - and to refuse
to do so - they gave Congress the power to "raise and support Ar-
mies" 46 and to "provide and maintain a Navy' 47 - and to refuse to
do so.
The historical background of the appropriations power reveals
why the Framers conferred such broad power upon Congress.48 The
provision was framed against the backdrop of 150 years of struggle
between the King and Parliament for control over the purse, often
centering on military matters. In 1624 the House of Commons condi-
tioned a grant of funds to the King for the first time when the Subsidy
Act of that year prohibited the use of any military monies except for
financing the navy, aiding the Dutch, and defending England and Ire-
land. 49 Two years later Charles I attempted to wage war without pop-
ular support, but Parliament promptly denied him funds to conductit.5o
By the 1670s Parliamentary control over the purse was firmly es-
tablished. Charles II insisted that the stationing of troops in Flanders
was a prerogative of the Crown. Parliament, however, saw it differ-
ently: it enacted the Supply Act of 1678,51 requiring that funds
granted be used to disband the Flanders forces. 52
Meeting in Philadelphia in 1787, the Framers were well aware of
the tradition of parliamentary power of the purse and its use to check
unwanted "national security" activities. "The purse and the sword
must not be in the same hands," George Mason said.53 Madison con-
sidered it "particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; art. III, § 1.
46. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
47. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
48. See generally R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH, 125-27
(1974).
49. J.P. KENYON, THE STUART CONSTITUTION, 1603-1688, at 58 (1966).
50. F. DIETZ, ENGLISH PUBLIC FINANCE 1558-1641 (2d ed. 1964).
51. 30 Car. II. c. 1 (1678).
52. See generally Abbot, The Long Parliament of Charles 11, 21 ENG. HIST. REV. 254
(1906).
53. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 144 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
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the command of the army, into the same hands."'54 He regarded the
power of the purse as "the most complete and effectual weapon with
which any Constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
people. ... -55 Accordingly, the Framers chose, in the words of Jeffer-
son, to transfer the war power "from the Executive to the Legislative
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."'5 6
Early practice comported with a broad reading of the appropria-
tions clause in national security matters. Presidents Jefferson and
Jackson, for example, when requesting Congressional instructions as
to the proper course to pursue in the face of threatened aggression by
Spain and marauding by South American pirates, respectively, recog-
nized that control of the "means" necessary to carry out any military
effort lies exclusively with Congress. The Nixon Administration rec-
ognized the supremacy of Congress's power of the purse even as it
asserted broad power under the Commander-in-Chief clause to prose-
cute the war in Vietnam. Indeed, it conceded that Congress could use
the power of the purse to control troop deployment decisions. s7
The Supreme Court, accordingly, has never held unconstitutional
any use of the appropriations power to limit the exercise of power by
the executive branch.5 8 The only limitation on an appropriation act
that the Court has invalidated 59 exceeded a constitutional limitation
on the power of Congress - the prohibition against bills of attain-
der.60 "Congress alone controls the raising of revenues and their ap-
propriations," Justice Jackson wrote in the Steel Seizure Case.6' Only
it "may determine in what manner and by what means they shall be
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (J. Madison).
55. M. FARRAND, supra note 53, at 81.
56. 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 397 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).
57. Secretary of State Rogers testified:
THE CHAIRMAN [Fulbright]: Do you question the constitutionality of the right of
Congress to bring back the troops from Europe? Do you think that is going beyond our
constitutional power?
Secretary [of State William] ROGERS: Well, no. As I understand Senator Mansfield's
resolution, it refers to appropriation of funds, and that is, of course, within the constitutional
powers of the Congress.
THE CHAIRMAN: It is clearly within our powers.
War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1971).
58. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1597-1619 (1973) (setting forth a summary of all acts of Congress held
unconstitutional in whole or in part).
59. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
60. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3.
61. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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spent for military and naval procurement. '62
Congress thus relied upon its sole power of the purse to end the
Vietnam War. Beginning in 1973, seven statutory funding limitations
- such as the Boland Amendment 63 - prohibited the use of any ap-
propriated funds for military or paramilitary operations in, over, or off
the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.64
Though strongly objecting on policy grounds, the Nixon Administra-
tion never challenged the constitutional power of Congress to cut off
funds for the war. Similarly, in 1975, when President Ford sent in the
Marines to rescue the container ship Mayaguez from the Cambodian
military, his administration never argued that those funding limita-
tions were unconstitutional - only that they were inapplicable. If
Congress can use its power of the purse in time of war to control the
use of the armed forces, a fortiori Congress can employ that power in
time of peace to control the use of pre-publication review agreements.
Nowhere does the AFSA court explain how the President can ex-
pend funds for enforcing specified pre-publication review agreements
when no money has been appropriated for that purpose.
III. PRE-PUBLICATION REVIEW AGREEMENTS
Over the last decade, something terribly significant has happened
in this country, mostly unnoticed "beyond the Beltway" and often un-
heeded within it. The pall of government censorship has descended
upon vast numbers of persons who are among the most expert on key
matters of public concern. A regime of licensing has been imposed
upon a vitally important class of informed public discussants. These
individuals must seek the permission of a government censor before
publishing written work within their areas of expertise. If a work is
not submitted for government censorship, the author may be penalized
- even though it contains no classified information. The AFSA deci-
62. Id.
63. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-169, § 105, 99 Stat.
1002, 1003 (1985).
64. Section 30 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 was typical except in referring to "mili-
tary or paramilitary operations" rather than to "combat activities" or "involvement ... in hostil-
ities." Section 30 provides: "No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law
may be expended to finance military or paramilitary operation by the United States in or over
Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia." Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 732
(1973). The other provisions were: Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1975 Pub. L.
No. 93-437, § 839, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (88 Stat.) 1400; Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 1974, § 741, 87 Stat. 1045 (1974); Department of Defense Appro-
priation Authorization Act, 1974, § 806, 87 Stat. 615 (1973); Department of State Appropria-
tions Authorization Act of 1973, § 123, 87 Stat. 454 (1973); Joint Resolution of July 1, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 134; Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973, § 307, 87
Stat. 129 (1973).
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sion invalidates Congress's primary means to check this executive
abuse.
This system of censorship has been put in place following one of
the most unfortunate Supreme Court decisions in decades - Snepp v.
United States.65 The Court there upheld the validity of a pre-publica-
tion review agreement as applied to information that the government
conceded was not classified and, indeed, was available entirely on the
public record. Snepp had breached no duty to protect classified infor-
mation. The Court rested on interpretation of contract law, while dis-
posing of the First Amendment issue in a footnote, without even
hearing oral argument. It did not consider "whether national security
is harmed by such disclosures, or, if so, whether the adverse effects are
resolved effectively by the [Central Intelligence] Agency's scheme of
secrecy agreements." '66 Most important, the Court declined to con-
sider the countervailing interests undercut by secrecy agreements.
Those interests are weighty. Indeed, they lie at the core of our
structure of government. Since the time of Blackstone, Anglo-Ameri-
can law has taken a dim view of prior restraints on speech and the
press. In Near v. Minnesota,67 the Supreme Court found prior re-
straints to be presumptively unconstitutional. The reason is known to
every student of American constitutionalism: our First Amendment,
as Justice Brennan wisely put it in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,
has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government .... Implicit in this structural role is not only
'the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open,' . . . but the antecedent assumption that valuable public
debate - as well as other civic behavior - must be informed. The
structural model links the First Amendment to that process of commu-
nication necessary for a democracy to survive .... 68
The censorship agreements at which Section 630 was directed un-
dercut "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate. They un-
dercut the "process of communication necessary for a democracy to
survive." Who can begin to assess the chilling effect these agreements
have had upon free expression? How many articles have never been
written, and how many speeches never given about the "disinforma-
tion" campaign against Libya; about the illegal mining of the harbors
65. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
66. Franck & Eisen, Balancing National Security and Free Speech, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 339, 343 (1982).
67. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
68. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
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of Nicaragua; about the sale of Hawk missiles to Iran and the diver-
sion of funds to the contras; and about the most massive Pentagon
procurement scandal in the nation's history, because a would-be au-
thor or speaker was unwilling to submit to the heavy hand of the gov-
ernment's censor? Can we ever begin to measure the damage inflicted
upon the marketplace of ideas in this country by excluding from it
information and ideas vitally important to petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances or to casting an informed vote?
I do not suggest that government has no interest in keeping secrets.
Nor do I suggest that secrecy agreements are always necessarily to be
avoided. Narrow and precisely drafted agreements might, for exam-
ple, be justified in circumstances involving individuals, employed by
intelligence agencies, who have direct access to extraordinarily sensi-
tive information that is legitimately classified because it relates to bona
fide intelligence sources or methods.
The point is, however, that policymakers ought not be deluded into
accepting a false choice, one that suggests that our nation must choose
between massive censorship or national annihilation. It does not. The
art of statesmanship, in Congress or on the bench, lies in devising a
solution that strikes a balance between the competing interests of free
expression and national security, not a solution of the sort imposed by
the federal district court in AFSA that affirms one interest while dis-
carding altogether another set of vital interests.
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